

# PKI Web Services

**Danske Bank**

**Application Security Infrastructure**

This document describes PKI Web Services implemented by Danske Bank. The PKI Web Services enable bank customers to get and manage certificates for use in secure communication with the bank.

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## 2. Log of changes

Version	Author	Date	Change
0.1	Mikkel T. Jensen	21.09.2009	Document created
1.0	Mikkel T. Jensen	23.09.2009	Revised after review.
1.1	Mikkel T. Jensen	10.12.2009	KeyGeneratorWDetails element removed from CreateCertificate and RenewCertificate. SSL encryption of web services added. HMAC signature on CreateCertificateRequest replaced by PIN.
1.2	Mikkel T. Jensen	16.04.2010	Revocation changed to revoke both signing and encryption cert. RequestId element moved inside actual request elements (schema change). WSDL changed to only require encryption of CreateCertificate and RenewCertificate requests. Reference to 'Encryption, Signing and Compression in Financial WS' added.
1.3	Mikkel T. Jensen	26.04.2010	Updated example XML.
1.4	Mikkel T. Jensen	27.05.2010	CRL distribution added. Id attribute on request and response elements changed to xml:id (schema change). Various metadata elements added to headers and request elements (schema changes).
1.5	Mikkel T. Jensen		Additional error codes added.
1.6	Michael Andersen & Lea Troels Møller Pedersen	05.11.2010	<p>Bank CA certificate moved from GetBankCertificates to CreateCertificate and RenewCertificate.</p> <p>Field "CAID" deleted from input to all operations.</p> <p><b>CreateCertificate:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Added CACert as output</li> <li>- Changed returncodes, so no extra information is given about whether a user exists.</li> </ul> <p><b>RenewCertificate:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Added CACert as output</li> <li>- Changed returncodes so general codes are used</li> <li>- Timestamp removed from output</li> </ul> <p><b>RevokeCertificate</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- CRLReasoncode changed from string to int.</li> </ul> <p><b>CertificateStatus:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Removed status "unknown" (now an error).</li> <li>- CRLReasoncode changed from string to int.</li> <li>- Added CertificateType to output to indicate signing or encryption cert</li> <li>- Added MatchingCertificateSerialNo to output to identify matching signing/encryption certificate.</li> </ul> <p><b>GetOwnCertificateList</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Added CertificateStatus to output in order to save an extra call to CertificateStatus operation</li> </ul> <p><b>GetBankCertificates:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Removed input field KeyGeneratorType</li> <li>- Removed input field CustomerId</li> <li>- Removed output field BankCACert</li> </ul> <p>Added description of format for CertificateSerialNo.</p> <p>Appendices now only represented by a letter.</p> <p>Illustrations of XML structure now before field explanations.</p> <p>Error codes grouped and updated.</p>
1.7	Lea Troels Møller Pedersen	25.11.2010	Updated description of the customer test environment.
1.8	Lea Troels Møller Pedersen	08.12.2010	Added UTC timestamp requirement.

1.9	Michael Andersen	14.12.2011	Added appendix D about a problem with verification of XML-DSIG signatures in .NET.
2.0	Thomas Malmstrøm	10.07.2012	Changed GetOwnCertificateList to include revoked and expired certificates.
2.1	Lea Troels Møller Pedersen	15.11.2012	Name change to Danske Bank.
2.2	Prashanth Rai	22.02.2016	6.5 Updated the Environment attribute should be “PRODUCTION” instead of “production”
2.3	Mikkel T. Jensen	05.12.2016	Clarified that error responses are not signed. Wsdl and xsd updated to have local schema references for XMLDSIG and XMLENC schemas. Type added to ExceptCertificateSerialNo element in xsd. Undoing faulty update regarding Environment attribute made in version 2.2.
2.4	Andreja Andric	27.07.2017	Reformulations of several phrasings according to suggestions from internal security experts
2.5	Mikkel T. Jensen	18.09.2018	Updated section on certificate distribution and renewal.
2.6.	Andreja Andric	21.03.2023	Changed the title to PKI Web Services, fixed broken links and removed the obsolete Appendix D.
2.7.	Andreja Andric	18.08.2023	Changed the Environment values to the correct value <i>customertest</i> , wherever it indicated customer test environment, but was stated in some other way, like <i>test</i> , <i>systemtest</i> and the like. Added that RequestId has a length limitation of up to 10 characters.
2.8.	Andreja Andric	05.09.2023	Updated the algorithms in examples.
2.9.	Andreja Andric	01.08.2025	Added clarification of SOAP version (1.1)

### 3. Introduction

This document describes the PKI Web Services implemented by Danske Bank. The services are to be used by customers for certificate creation and management. The certificates are to be used for communication with the bank, e.g. to communicate with EDI Web Services.

### 4. Channels of communication

The services described in this document will be available as SOAP web services. Other channels may be added later. The web services will be protected by SSL encryption, as well as encryption applied at the message level.

The web services to be implemented are further described in WSDL file PKIService.wsdl and in the XML schema file PKIFactory.xsd. The URL of PKI service is:

- <https://businessws.danskebank.com/ra/pkiservice.asmx>

### 5. Standards used

The PKI service is based on the following standards:

- XMLDSIG: *XML Signature Syntax and Processing (Second Edition)*.  
<http://www.w3.org/TR/xmldsig-core1/>
- XML Encryption: *XML Encryption Syntax and Processing*. <http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlenc-core/>
- X.509v3: *Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile*.  
<http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280>
- PKCS#10: *PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7*.  
<http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2986>
- SOAP: *Simple Object Access Protocol*. We are supporting SOAP version 1.1.  
<http://www.w3.org/TR/soap/>
- WSDL: *Web Services Description Language (WSDL) 1.1*. <http://www.w3.org/TR/wsdl>

### 6. About the PKI service

The security used by the bank is based on PKI (public key infrastructure), which is based on public-private key cryptography. In the bank setup, every customer has two certificates: one for signing, and another for encryption. When the customer sends files to the bank, customer signs the message using customer's private key corresponding to the customer's signing certificate. When the bank sends files to the customer, bank encrypts the message using customer's public key corresponding to the customer's encryption certificate. The customer decrypts the message using customer's private key corresponding to the customer's encryption certificate. Similarly, customer encrypts message to the bank using bank's public key corresponding to the bank's encryption certificate, while bank signs message to the customer using bank's private key corresponding to the bank's signing certificate. Table 1 shows this relationship.


	Encryption	Decryption	Signing	Verification
Customer to Bank	Bank's encryption certificate	Bank's private Key	Customer's private key	Customer's public signing certificate
Bank to Customer	Customer's encryption certificate	Customer's private Key	Bank's private key	Bank's public signing certificate

Table 1. Summary of PKI service

The certificates are organized in a hierarchy, the root of which is the bank *root certificate*. The bank root certificate is a self-signed certificate and it is used to sign the other bank certificates. The bank certificates are:

- The root certificate. This certificate is self-signed, and is obtained by the customer through download from the bank homepage. The certificate is obtained in a package signed by VeriSign, and the customer should verify this signature before trusting the certificate received in the package. After this, the bank root certificate can be used by the customer software to verify the other bank certificates.
- The CA (Certificate Authority) certificate. This certificate is used to sign customer certificates. The bank has several CA certificates, the one relevant for a specific customer depends on the customers relationship to the bank as well as the mechanism used by the customer to generate the keys (generated in software or by a hardware security module).
- The encryption certificate. This certificate is used to encrypt messages sent to the bank.
- The signing certificate. This certificate is used to sign messages sent from the bank.

The hierarchy of certificates is displayed in the diagram below.



## 6.1. Certificate distribution and renewal

Every certificate in the hierarchy has a certain lifetime. The lifetime of the bank root certificate is 20 years. For the other certificates, the lifetime is shorter (two years or less). Every time a certificate is about to expire, a new certificate must be issued and distributed.

Regarding the customer certificates, the customer must call the RenewCertificate operation in order to get a new set of certificates. This must be done before the old certificates expire.

Regarding the bank certificates, initial distribution of the root certificate, when the customer has never used the PKI WS system before, is handled through another channel than the PKI service. Contact support for details.

Once the customer has a valid root certificate, he uses the GetBankCertificates operation to fetch the encryption and signing bank certificates. The operation is also used to fetch a new bank root certificate if it is available. This is possible since a new root certificate is issued well before the old root certificate expires, which means that the old root certificate and its associated signing certificate can be used to verify the response in which the new root certificate is received.

The intermediate CA certificate used for a particular customer certificate is distributed along with the customer certificates in the CreateCertificate and RenewCertificate operations. The lifetimes of the intermediate CA certificate follow the lifetime of the issuing root certificate.


Regarding the RSA key sizes of the certificates, the root and intermediate CA certificates are based on 4096 bit RSA, while all other certificates are based on 2048 bit RSA.

## 6.2. Certificate status

Each certificate has a status. The status of a certificate can be any of the following:

- Good: The certificate is valid, and will continue to be valid for a reasonable period of time.
- Expires soon: The certificate will expire soon, and should be renewed.
- Expired: The certificate has expired and is no longer valid.
- Revoked: The certificate has been revoked.

The following transition diagram shows the possible transitions between the statuses:



The bold boxes are final states. The statuses are changed by the following incidents:

Incident number	Description
1	The certificate is issued. Prior to this, the certificate does not exist.
2	Time goes by, and the certificate gets sufficiently close to the expiry date.
3	The certificate is revoked.
4	Time goes by, and the certificate expires.

## 6.3. The certificate generation process

When a customer needs to create an encryption and signing certificate pair, he generates two public/private key pairs on his computer. The public keys are placed in PKCS#10 requests, which are sent to the PKI service, using the CreateCertificate or RenewCertificate operations. The bank inspects the PKCS#10 requests, and if all goes well, it issues certificates, signs them with the CA certificate and sends the certificates to the customer. Notice that the private keys of the customer are never revealed to the bank or to anybody else. Thus, since only the customer has access to the private keys, only the customer is able to sign documents with the customer signature, and only the customer is able to decrypt messages encrypted with the customer encryption certificate.

The bank strongly recommends that customers generate and store the keys using a HSM instead of software. This is because the private keys are much more difficult to steal if they are stored in a HSM. The CreateCertificate and RenewCertificate operations take as input the source of the keys (software or HSM). It is up to the customer to set this parameter correctly, since there is no way for the bank to verify the source of a specific key. The reason the bank needs to know the source of the

key is that certificates based on HSM keys may be granted a longer duration, and that in certain situations in which bank security is attacked, it can be advantageous to know the source of the keys.

The customer's public key has to be 2048 bits long (shorter keys will be rejected). The length of the bank's public key is also 2048 bits.

#### **6.4. Bank CRL distribution**

The bank distributes a CRL (Certificate Revocation List) of revoked bank certificates. Only bank certificates will be in the list, while revoked customer certificates will not be found in the CRL. The CRL is returned as a standard ASN.1 DER encoded CRL according to RFC3280. The CRL is issued every 24 hours, and is valid for 48 hours. It is the responsibility of the customer software to regularly fetch the updated CRL, and to validate the bank certificates used in communication against the CRL.

The CRL will be distributed via http at the endpoint specified in the root certificate.

#### **6.5. Calling the service during development**

During integration to the service, it is possible to call some of the operations in a *test-mode*, which makes sure no changes are made to the bank database. While working in test-mode, the operations effectively work in a dummy mode, which means no real certificates are issued, and no revocations are made. This also means that the return values from operations working in test-mode will be dummy data.

Test-mode is available for all operations but GetBankCertificate behaves the same in test-mode and production mode. CertificateStatus and GetOwnCertificateList are safe to call in production mode in the sense that they do not make any changes to the bank databases. However, test-mode is provided so it is easier to test that different output is handled correctly.

The operations are called in test-mode by setting the Environment attribute found in the RequestHeader to 'customertest'. For CreateCertificate, RenewCertificate, and RevokeCertificate the Environment attribute must also be set to 'customertest' in the operation specific request element.

When calling the real operations, the Environment attribute must be set to 'production' or left out completely, which defaults to 'production'.

Operation	Behavior in test-mode
All	<p>The following is checked for all operations before anything else:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Compliance with the WSDL and XML schema</li> <li>• Correct signature (when applicable)</li> <li>• Understandable encryption (when applicable)</li> <li>• Uniqueness of RequestId, CustomerId, and Timestamp combined</li> <li>• Timestamp is neither too old nor too far in the future</li> </ul>

CreateCertificate	The pin 1234 will give a valid response back. Anything else gives return code 20.
RenewCertificate	Any PKCS#10 request that starts with “M” gives a valid response. Any other value in the PKCS#10 request gives return code 10 suggesting a problem with the PKCS#10 requests.
RevokeCertificate	The serial numbers 5169000000001702 and 3379000000001502 will not be found. Anything else gives a valid response back.
CertificateStatus	Any serial number not ending in 01 or 02 will not be found. For other serial numbers the following statuses are reported: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Serial number starting with 0: Status “Revoked”. Expiry date and revocation time are hardcoded.</li> <li>• Serial number starting with 1: Status “Expired”. Expiry date will be yesterday.</li> <li>• Serial number starting with 2: Status “Expires soon”. Expiry date will be tomorrow.</li> <li>• Any other serial number: Status “Good”. Expiry date will be a year from current date.</li> </ul>
GetOwnCertificateList	4 hardcoded certificates (2 certificate pairs) are returned. 2 will have status “Good” and 2 will have status “Expires soon”. Expiry dates are formatted identical to those from CertificateStatus. CustomerId “207161” or RequestId “123456789” gives return code 11, “User not authorized”.
GetBankCertificate	Same behavior as production mode.

## 6.6. The RequestId element

Each request element has a sub-element called RequestId. RequestId should be 10 characters or less in length. In combination with the CustomerId sub-element and the Timestamp sub-element, this ID should always be unique.

## 6.7. The Timestamp element

Every request has a sub-element that is named Timestamp. This element contains the time at which the request was generated. UTC (Zulu) time must be used. Requests with timestamps that differ more than 10 minutes from the current time will be rejected.

## 6.8. Regarding digital signatures and encryption

The specifications for XML encryption and XML digital signatures contain some degrees of freedom as to how the elements inside the encrypted data and digital signatures should be used. The encrypted data and digital signatures used for the PKI service should satisfy the requirements described in the document

*Encryption, Signing and Compression in Financial Web Services*

which can be obtained from the bank.

Example XML satisfying the requirements can be found in appendix B.

### 6.8.1. References and id-attributes in signatures

The signature type used in requests and responses is *enveloped style*. For requests, the signature must sign the actual request element (e.g. the RenewCertificate element). The remainder of the request is not signed. In responses, the signature will cover the actual response element (e.g. RenewCertificateResponse). The remainder of the response is not signed.

In responses from the bank, the signatures will reference the xml:id attribute of the response element. An example of this is the response found in appendix B. The RenewCertificateResponse element has the attribute xml:id="response", while the enveloped signature contains a Reference element with an attribute URI="#response". This means that the signature on the response element can be verified while the response element is inside the SOAP message, as well as in a context where the surrounding XML has been stripped.

Customers are encouraged to use the same kind of referencing when signing requests, but since signatures on requests will be verified in a context in which the SOAP message has been stripped and in which the Request element is the root element, signatures containing Reference elements with URI="" (whole document) references will also be accepted, provided the signature covers the actual request element and none of its sibling or parent elements.

## 7. Operation and message types

The operations and messages are described in a WSDL file (PKIService.wsdl) and an XML schema file (PKIFactory.xsd). The operations are the following:


- CreateCertificate
- RenewCertificate
- RevokeCertificate
- CertificateStatus
- GetOwnCertificateList
- GetBankCertificates

For each operation there is a Request element (e.g. CreateCertificateRequest) and a Response element (e.g. CreateCertificateResponse). The operations share header elements in the form of the RequestHeader and ResponseHeader elements.

In the next sections, the general aspects of the operations as well as the specific requests and response will be described.

### 7.1. Generally about all of the operations

All of the operations use the following message structure:



The diagram is based on the **CreateCertificate** operation, but the structure is the same for all of the operations. Since the transport used is SOAP webservices, the topmost element is a SOAP envelope. This contains a SOAP header and a SOAP body. The soap body contains the **CreateCertificateRequest** and a **RequestHeader**. The header contains information such as request id and environment identification (customertest, production), while the actual request data are located in the **CreateCertificateRequest** element. This element is signed by the sender, and encrypted while in transit.

The structure is the same for all of the requests, except the **CreateCertificateIn** and **CreateCertificateRequest** elements are replaced by other elements (the names match “\*In” and “\*Request”). The same structure is used for the responses. For these, the elements named “\*In” are replaced by “\*Out”, while the request elements “\*Request” are replaced by “\*Response” elements. For responses, the **RequestHeader** is replaced by a **ResponseHeader**.

Regarding the use of encryption, messages containing sensitive information are encrypted, while messages without such content are not encrypted. In this context, sensitive information is requests for certificates (since they may be based on a secret PIN, and since they may contain a challenge password to be used for revocation at a later time<sup>1</sup>). When encryption is used, the relevant request element is replaced by an **EncryptedData** element from the XML encryption standard. This element can be decrypted into the request element using standard tools.

Regarding signatures, most of the messages are signed, since the signatures are necessary to guarantee that the other party is in fact who he claims to be, and in order to ensure the messages are not changed in transit. The only request elements which are not signed are the **GetBankCertificateRequest** and the **CreateCertificateRequest**.

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<sup>1</sup> The challenge password functionality for revocation will not be supported in the first version of the PKIService, but it may be added at a later stage.

- Regarding GetBankCertificateRequest, the element is not signed since the operation must be callable in a situation where the client does not yet have a certificate. Since there is nothing sensitive about the bank certificates, there is no risk in not signing these request elements.
- Regarding CreateCertificateRequest, it is impossible for the client to sign the request using a certificate (since the client has no certificate when calling the operation). Instead, authentication is done using a PIN inside the request. The integrity of the request is secured by encryption.

All of the response elements are signed, except error-responses. The signatures used are enveloped-style.

All of the operations return ReturnCode and ReturnText elements. If the operation failed, they will contain information about the error (the elements will be contained in a PKIFactoryServiceFault element, and there will be no response element). If the operation succeeded, they will be contained in the response element. PKIFactoryServiceFault elements are neither signed nor encrypted.

The operations that have “CertificateSerialNo” as input or output expect the content of the field “Serial Number” from an X.509 certificate. The format must be decimal (e.g. 6230000005018301) and not hexadecimal (e.g. 162226E93FF2BD).

### 7.1.1. Header content

The RequestHeader element contains the following sub elements:

Sub element	Meaning
SenderId	String identifying the sender of the request. In some cases, the SenderId will be identical to the CustomerId, in other cases it may be something else. The customer will be told what value to use.
CustomerId	String identifying the customer of the request. The content of the element must match the content of the CustomerId element found in the actual request element. The customer will be told what value to use.
RequestId	String identifying the request. The combination of CustomerId and RequestId must be unique for 3 months. The content of the element must match the content of the RequestId element found in the actual request element.
Timestamp	The time at which the request was sent. UTC (Zulu) time must be used.
InterfaceVersion	A string identifying the version of the PKIService. The current version is 1.
Environment	A string identifying the environment. The environments relevant for customers are: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• production: The production environment issuing certificates to be used with the banking software.</li> <li>• customertest. A test environment for customers to use when they are creating the integration to the PKIService.</li> </ul>

The ResponseHeader element contains the following sub elements:

Sub element	Meaning
SenderId	The value from the RequestHeader is echoed.
CustomerId	The value from the RequestHeader is echoed.
RequestId	The value from the RequestHeader is echoed.
Timestamp	The time at which the response was generated. UTC (Zulu) time will be used.
InterfaceVersion	A string identifying the version of the PKI service. The current version is 1.
Environment	The value from the RequestHeader is echoed.

### 7.1.2. Faults

If an error occurs during the processing of an operation, a PKIFactoryServiceFault is returned. If InterfaceVersion is 1, the PKIFactoryServiceFault is wrapped in a normal SOAP envelope. PKIFactoryServiceFault is not signed. The fault contains the following sub elements:

Sub element	Meaning
SenderId	The value from the RequestHeader will be echoed, if possible.
CustomerId	The value from the RequestHeader will be echoed, if possible.
RequestId	The value from the RequestHeader will be echoed, if possible.
Timestamp	The time at which the response was generated. UTC (Zulu) time will be used.
InterfaceVersion	A string identifying the version of the PKI service.
Environment	The value from the RequestHeader will be echoed, if possible.
ReturnCode	A code identifying the type of error.
ReturnText	A textual description of the error.
AdditionalReturnText	In some cases this element will contain extra information regarding the error. This element is optional.


A list of error codes can be found in appendix A.

## 7.2. Specific operations

In this section, the different operations, their parameters and return values are described.

### 7.2.1. CreateCertificate

The CreateCertificate operation is used if the customer has no valid signing certificate (e.g. the first time the customer needs to create certificates). The parameters in the CreateCertificateRequest are as follows:




Sub element	Meaning
CustomerId	A key identifying the customer. Each customer will be informed about the value to use.
KeyGeneratorType	Information about the mechanism used to generate the keys. The element KeyGeneratorType should hold the value 'HSM' if the keys are generated by and stored in hardware and 'software' otherwise.
EncryptionCertPKCS10	A base64binary encoded PKCS#10 request. The request contains the public key of the encryption certificate to be issued. The PKCS#10 specification allows for other attributes, but these are not used in the resulting certificate. The bank's existing information about the customer will always be used.
SigningCertPKCS10	A base64binary encoded PKCS#10 request. The request contains the public key of the signing certificate to be issued, as well as other attributes (e.g. name). The PKCS#10 specification allows for other attributes, but these are not used in the resulting certificate. The bank's existing information about the customer will always be used.
Timestamp	The time at which the request was generated. UTC (Zulu) time must be used.
RequestId	String identifying the request. The combination of CustomerId and RequestId must be unique for 3 months.

Environment	A string identifying the environment. The environments relevant for customers are: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• production: The production environment issuing certificates to be used with the banking software.</li> <li>• customertest. A test environment for customers to use when they are creating the integration to the PKI service.</li> </ul> If the element is not present, the production environment will be used.
PIN	The PIN code.

All of these parameters except Environment are mandatory.

The return values of the operation are contained in the CreateCertificateResponse element:




Sub element	Meaning
ReturnCode	The return code of the operation call. If the code is '00', all went well. If the code is '20' then any of the following could have occurred: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- CustomerId does not exist</li> <li>- CustomerId is locked</li> <li>- wrong PIN</li> <li>- PIN has already been used</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- PIN has expired</li> <li>- there is no PIN assigned to the user</li> </ul> <p>The reason that these are all covered by 1 code is to avoid letting out information about whether or not a particular CustomerId exists in the system (prevent systematic exploits).</p> <p>Other possible return codes are of a more technical nature concerning SOAP, encryption etc. and are listed in appendix A.</p>
ReturnText	A text describing the status of the method call.
EncryptionCert	The base64 encoded customer encryption certificate.
SigningCert	The base64 encoded customer signing certificate.
CACert	CA certificate that EncryptionCert and SigningCert are issued under. This will always be issued under the current root certificate, which is distributed by the operation GetBankCertificates.
RequestId	String identifying the request. The RequestId from the request is returned.
Environment	A string identifying the environment. The string sent in the request is echoed back to the customer.
Signature	An enveloped signature signing the CreateCertificateResponse element. The signature is based on the bank signing certificate. The customer should always verify the signature. If the signature does not validate, the result returned should not be trusted, and the bank should be contacted.

### 7.2.2. RenewCertificate


The RenewCertificate operation is used to renew customer certificates if the customer has a valid signing certificate. The parameters in the RenewCertificateRequest are as follows:



Sub element	Meaning
CustomerId	See description in CreateCertificateRequest, section 7.2.1.
KeyGeneratorType	See description in CreateCertificateRequest, section 7.2.1.
EncryptionCertPKCS10	See description in CreateCertificateRequest, section 7.2.1.
SigningCertPKCS10	See description in CreateCertificateRequest, section 7.2.1.
Timestamp	The time at which the request was generated. UTC (Zulu) time must be used.
RequestId	String identifying the request. The combination of CustomerId and RequestId must be unique for 3 months.
Environment	A string identifying the environment. The environments relevant for customers are: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• production: The production environment issuing certificates to be used with the banking software.</li> <li>• customertest. A test environment for customers to use when they are creating the integration to the PKI service.</li> </ul> If the element is not present, the default is “production”.
Signature	An enveloped signature signing the RenewCertificateRequest element. The signature is based on the customer’s existing signing certificate. If the signature does not validate, no certificates will be issued.

All of these parameters are mandatory except Environment.

The return values of the operation are contained in the RenewCertificateResponse element. This element is structurally identical to the CreateCertificateResponse element, see section 7.2.1. There are differences in returncode values (“User not authorized” / “User Locked” instead of “Wrong CustomerId or PIN”).




### 7.2.3. RevokeCertificate

The RevokeCertificate operation is used to revoke certificates. Certificates should be revoked if they are no longer needed by the customer (e.g. if the customer is no longer a customer in the bank) or if the private keys of the certificates are compromised. The certificates will be revoked immediately by the PKI service. Instead of calling the RevokeCertificate operation, it is also possible for the customer to call the bank customer centre and ask for certificate revocation.

Note: Since the certificates are issued in pairs (one encryption certificate and one signing certificate), they are also revoked in pairs. This means that if a request indicates revocation of an encryption certificate, the corresponding signing certificate will also be revoked and vice versa.

The parameters are contained in the RevokeCertificateRequest, which holds the following sub elements:




Sub element	Mandatory	Meaning
KeyGeneratorType	M	Information about the mechanism used to generate the keys. Can be ‘HSM’ or ‘software’.
CustomerId	M	See description in CreateCertificateRequest, section 7.2.1.
RevokeAll	O	This element (if present) indicates that all of the customer’s certificates (of the type KeyGeneratorType) should be revoked. The optional sub element ExceptCertificateSerialNo can be used to indicate certificates that should not be revoked.
CertificateSerialNo	O	Contains the serial number of the certificate(s) to be revoked. Up to 10 CertificateSerialNo elements may be present.
CRLReason	O	A reason code describing why the certificates are to be revoked. The allowed reason codes are listed in appendix C.
Timestamp	M	The time at which the request was generated. UTC (Zulu) time must be used.
RequestId	M	String identifying the request. The combination of CustomerId and RequestId must be unique for 3 months.

Environment	O	A string identifying the environment. The environments relevant for customers are: <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• production: The production environment issuing certificates to be used with the banking software.</li><li>• customertest. A test environment for customers to use when they are creating the integration to the PKI service.</li></ul> If the element is not present, the default is “production”
Signature	M	Enveloped signature signing the RevokeCertificateRequest element. Must be based on the customers signing certificate.

One of the RevokeAll or CertificateSerialNo elements must be present.

The RevokeCertificate operation returns a RevokeCertificateResponse element, which contains the following sub elements:




Sub element	Meaning
ReturnCode	The return code of the operation call. If the code is ‘00’, all went well. The possible return codes are listed in appendix A.
ReturnText	See description in CreateCertificateResponse, section 7.2.1.

CertificateSerialNo	Serial number of certificate revoked. There will be one CertificateSerialNo element for every certificate revoked.
RevocationTime	The time from which the certificates is invalid. UTC (Zulu) time will be used.
RequestId	String identifying the request. The RequestId from the request is returned.
Environment	A string identifying the environment. The string sent in the request is echoed back to the customer.
Signature	An enveloped signature signing the RevokeCertificateResponse element. The signature is based on bank signing certificate. The customer should always verify the signature. If the signature does not validate, the result returned should not be trusted, and the bank should be contacted.

#### 7.2.4. CertificateStatus

This operation is used to get the status of a number of certificates. The idea behind the operation is that the customer software should automatically call it regularly (e.g. every day) to check, if the certificates should be renewed. It is also possible for the customer software to look inside the certificate to see the expiry date, but some customers may find it easier to call the service. The CertificateStatusRequest element has the following sub elements:




Sub element	Meaning
KeyGeneratorType	Information about the mechanism used to generate the keys. Can be 'HSM' or 'software'.

CertificateSerialNo	The serial number of the certificate. Up to 10 CertificateSerialNo elements can be present.
CustomerId	See description in CreateCertificateRequest, section 7.2.1.
Timestamp	The time at which the request was generated. UTC (Zulu) time must be used.
RequestId	String identifying the request. The RequestId from the request is returned.
Signature	Enveloped signature signing the CertificateStatusRequest element. Must be based on the customers signing certificate.

All of the sub elements are mandatory.

The operation returns a CertificateStatusResponse element, with the following attributes:



Sub element	Meaning
ReturnCode	The return code of the operation call. If the code is ‘00’, all went well. The possible return codes are listed in appendix A.
ReturnText	See description in CreateCertificateResponse, section 7.2.1.
CertificateStatus	Element holding the following sub elements: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <code>CertificateSerialNo</code>: The serial number of the certificate.</li> <li>• <code>CertificateType</code>: either “signing” or “encryption”</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• MatchingCertificateSerialNo: If CertificateType is “signing” then this field contains the serial number of the “encryption” certificate (and vice versa).</li> <li>• Status: element containing one sub element, see the description in the following table.</li> </ul>
Timestamp	A timestamp indicating at what time the status was taken. UTC (Zulu) time will be used.
RequestId	String identifying the request. The RequestId from the request is returned.
Signature	An enveloped signature signing the CertificateStatusResponse element. The signature is based on the bank signing certificate. The customer should always verify the signature. If the signature does not validate, the result returned should not be trusted, and the bank should be contacted.


The Status sub-element within the CertificateStatus element contains one of the following sub elements:

Sub element	Meaning
good	The certificate status is good. The element has an attribute called expiryDate containing the time of expiry.
expires_soon	The certificate is still valid but must be renewed. The element has an attribute called expiryDate containing the time of expiry.
expired	The certificate has expired. The element has an attribute called expiryDate containing the time of expiry.
revoked	The certificate has been revoked. The element has two attributes <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• revocationDate containing the time of revocation. UTC (Zulu) time will be used.</li> <li>• CRLReason containing the reason for revocation. The list of possible values can be found in appendix C.</li> </ul>

### 7.2.5. GetOwnCertificateList

This operation returns the list of serial numbers of all certificates with the following statuses : “good”, “expires\_soon”, “revoked” and “expired” owned by the customer, including their statuses. The list includes all certificates issued to the customer of type “KeyGeneratorType”. The format of the list is similar to that of the operation CertificateStatus.


The GetOwnCertificateListRequest element contains the following sub elements:



Sub element	Meaning
KeyGeneratorType	Information about the mechanism used to generate the keys. Can be ‘HSM’ or ‘software’.
CustomerId	See description in CreateCertificateRequest, section 7.2.1.
Timestamp	The time at which the request was generated. UTC (Zulu) time must be used.
RequestId	String identifying the request. The RequestId from the request is returned.
Signature	Enveloped signature signing the GetOwnCertificateListRequest element. Must be based on the customers signing certificate.

All of the sub elements are mandatory.

The GetOwnCertificateListResponse element contains the following sub elements:



Sub element	Meaning
ReturnCode	The return code of the operation call. If the code is ‘00’, all went well. The possible return codes are listed in appendix A.
ReturnText	See description in CreateCertificateResponse, section 7.2.1.
CertificateStatus	See description in CertificateStatusResponse, section 7.2.4.
RequestId	String identifying the request. The RequestId from the request is returned.
Signature	An enveloped signature signing the GetOwnCertificateListResponse element. The signature is based on bank signing certificate. The customer should always verify the signature. If the signature does not validate, the result returned should not be trusted, and the bank should be contacted.

## 7.2.6. GetBankCertificate


The GetBankCertificate operation returns the current bank certificates. The operation is used to keep the bank certificates kept by the customer up-to-date. The customer software is supposed to

automatically call the service at regular intervals and update the bank certificates stored by the customer.

In order to be able to verify the signature on the response, it is necessary for the customer to have a valid bank root certificate. Since the root certificate will also be updated over time, it is also included in the reply.

The operation is **not** supposed to be used in situations where the customer does not have a valid bank root certificate. In such situations the customer must obtain the bank root certificate by other means (maybe on a CD obtained from the bank, the exact mechanism for initial root certificate distribution is yet to be decided).


The GetBankCertificateRequest element has the following sub elements:



Sub element	Meaning
BankRootCertificateSerialNo	Serial number of the newest bank root certificate trusted by the customer. The parameter is necessary in order for the bank software to identify the signing certificate to sign the response.
Timestamp	The time at which the request was generated. UTC (Zulu) time must be used.
RequestId	String identifying the request. The RequestId from the request is returned.

All of the sub elements are mandatory.

The GetBankCertificatesResponse element contains the following sub elements:



Sub element	Meaning
ReturnCode	The return code of the operation call. If the code is '00', all went well. The possible return codes are listed in appendix A.
ReturnText	See description in CreateCertificateResponse, section 7.2.1.
BankEncryptionCert	The newest base64 encoded bank encryption certificate issued under BankRootCert.
BankSigningCert	The newest base64 encoded bank signing certificate issued under BankRootCert.
BankRootCert	The current base64 encoded bank root certificate.
RequestId	String identifying the request. The RequestId from the request is returned.
Signature	An enveloped signature signing the GetBankCertificatesResponse element. The customer should always verify the signature. If the signature cannot be verified, the result returned should not be trusted, and the bank should be contacted. In addition to verifying the signature itself, the certificate used should always be checked against the root certificate indicated in the request. The bank certificate used for signing is included in the signature block and is the newest bank signing certificate issued under the root certificate indicated by the serial number in the request.

	<p>It is not necessarily the same as the certificate in the field “BankSigningCert”. This will be the case when a new root certificate (and corresponding tree) exists.</p>
--	---

## Appendix A: Error codes

The following is a list of error codes and descriptions of the error.

General errors (shared between operations):

Error Code	Description
00	No error. Operation went OK.
01	Malformed XML.
02	Invalid signature.
03	Decryption error.
04	Signing certificate expired.
05	Encryption certificate expired.
06	Missing signature.
07	Schema validation error.
08	Signing certificate not valid or trusted.
09	Input error.
10	Other backend error.
11	User not authorized.
12	User locked.
99	Unknown error.

CreateCertificate:

Error Code	Description
20	Wrong CustomerId or PIN (or other PIN error)

RevokeCertificate:

Error Code	Description
30	Some certificates could not be revoked (revoked certs are listed).

GetBankCertificates:

Error Code	Description
40	Unknown root certificate serial number.

Additional error codes may be added at a later time.

## Appendix B: Example XML

### a. *RenewCertificateRequest example*

This appendix shows the process of building a request to the PKI service. The examples have been modified in order to improve readability.

The five XML documents in this example are distributed along with this document as well as examples for the other operations in the PKI service.

The content of the PKCS#10 requests in the requests does not match the certificates returned. Note also that the content of the certificates should not be taken as representative of how the real certificates will look.

#### i. Unsigned request element

The following is an example RenewCertificateRequest. The request is neither signed nor encrypted.

```

<tns:RenewCertificateRequest xmlns:xe="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#"
  xmlns:xd="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#" xmlns:tns="http://danskebank.dk/PKI/PKIFactoryService/elements"
  xmlns:soapenv="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" xmlns:pkif="http://danskebank.dk/PKI/PKIFactoryService">
  <tns:CustomerId>360817</tns:CustomerId>
  <tns:KeyGeneratorType>software</tns:KeyGeneratorType>
  <tns:EncryptionCertPKCS10>MIIBnTCCAQYCAQAwXTELMAkGA1UEBhMCU0cxETAPBgNVBAoTCE0yQ3J5cH
RvMRIwEAYDVQQDEwlsb2NhGhvc3QxJzAlBgkqhkiG9w0BCQEWWGFkbWluQHNIcnZlci5leGFtcGxILmRvbTCBnzAN
BgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOBjQAwgYkCgYEAr1nYY1Qrl1rub/FqICRrr5nvupdIN+3wF7q915tvEQoc74bnu6b8IbbGRMhzd
zmvQ4SzFfVEAuMMuTHeybPq5th7YDrTNizKKxOBnqE2KYuX9X22A1Kh49soJFg6kPb9MUgiZBiMIvtb7K3CHfgw5Wa
gWnL8Lb+ccvKZZI+8CAwEAaAAMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAUAA4GBAHpoRp5YS55CZpy+wdigQEwjL/wSluo+Wjtpv
P0YoBMJu4VMKeZi405R7o8oEwiPdlrliKNknFmHKlaCKTLRcU59ScA6ADEIWUzqmUzP5Cs6jrSRo3NKfg1bd09D1K9rs
QkRc9Urv9mRBIsredGnYECNeRaK5R1yzpOwninXC</tns:EncryptionCertPKCS10>
  <tns:SigningCertPKCS10>MIIBXjCBYAlBADAfMQswCQYDVQQGEwJGSTEQMA4GA1UEAxMHZXQgbmF2bjCB
nzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOBjQAwgYkCgYEAn4fmoxL7BUIZAcj7I0XvhJshYJRg4ggYe76Mmtmk7jEJv2gGLoE5Y
glajJauGncFMKo3/OoKJ92XVDAwZg6SYj5cXnsQR3rDo6990cczyLuu7UuaNcXw3sd4GtfdoPveKQCbKpp9xXPCydFp9
syT7WAk2L268euedUC4g938CAwEAaAAMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAA4GBABwurQs6f7Ue6Y0NhYPfdWo3qBRXnB
o/d3Wt2yi2NkFwizbq/ZsJ0wDQ7W4Dg9hRndROjOZTmnYeNKRSJOYHzGrLbgZto7mezdnS/W2QL56CsdAh7U7jYo4Of
gdTyc8XQmnSYbspRShV28gOkKgfQCZ3A/oAYkmIEC83ZhKG+1o </tns:SigningCertPKCS10>
  <tns:Timestamp>2022-05-20T12:20:19Z</tns:Timestamp>
  <tns:RequestId>398</tns:RequestId>
</tns:RenewCertificateRequest>
```

## ii. Signed request element

This is an example in which the RenewCertificateRequest has been signed:

```

<tns:RenewCertificateRequest xmlns:pkif="http://danskebank.dk/PKI/PKIFactoryService"
    xmlns:soapenv="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" xmlns:xe="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#"
    xmlns:xd="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#" xmlns:tns="http://danskebank.dk/PKI/PKIFactoryService/elements">
    <tns:CustomerId>360817</tns:CustomerId>
    <tns:KeyGeneratorType>software</tns:KeyGeneratorType>

    <tns:EncryptionCertPKCS10>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</tns:EncryptionCertPKCS10>

    <tns:SigningCertPKCS10>MIIBXjCBByAIBADAfMQswCQYDVQQGEwJGSTEQMA4GA1UEAxMHZXQgbmF2bjCBnzANB
    gkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAOBjQAwgYkCgYEAn4fmoXL7BuTzAcj7I0XjvhJshYJRg4ggYe76Mmtmkm7xjEjv2gGLoE5YglJa
    uGncFMKo3/OoKJ92XVDawZg6SYj5cXnsQR3rDo6990cczyLuu7UuaNcXw3sd4GtfdpveKQCbKpp9xPCydFp9syT7W
    Ak2L268euedUC4g938CAwEEAAaAMA0GCSqGSib3DQEBBQUAA4GBABwurQs6f7Ue6Y0NhYPfdW03qBRXnBo/d3Wt
    2yi2NkFwizbzq/ZsJ0wDQ7W4Dg9hRndROjOZTmnYeNKRSJOYHzGrLbgZto7mezdnW2QL56CsdAh7U7jYo4OfgdTyc8
    XQmnssYbspRShV28gOkKgfQZC3A/oAYkmIEC83Zhkg+1o</tns:SigningCertPKCS10>
    <tns:Timestamp>2022-05-20T12:20:19Z</tns:Timestamp>
    <tns:RequestId>398</tns:RequestId>

<Signature xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
    <SignedInfo>
        <CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#" />
        <SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-sha256" />
        <Reference URI="">
            <Transforms>
                <Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature" />
                <Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#" />
            </Transforms>
            <DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256" />
            <DigestValue>hzg15MV+vAsNCdMPnDSjXP8X8D0NRypV5dkpWW7+VKE=</DigestValue>
        </Reference>
    </SignedInfo>
    <SignatureValue>
        GI+qRm4tHaEl5viuMtqp8QtHUwwSrnUA+8YJ5fBLSxN7cReINwDmBxxkj5wtvNINf6BncGtfM7FMIyUg4fzQ/SB69
        E0ssF17CRdsvQtYBvMzqu7jerQeTarR9nVvMuoIT0wFqjiEvkocTYRUVcpHSo26R0j19LUvSN27fSnOGCh7UZZy
        Y7jpn2rn0uuqW8IDcqjGY8zUU1/QdAiGsWLLtALQikWlsHdulu9QABWfzsugGs1Yd5Ok+qXswrMyksja0Mz1Zud4i
        cBu/xFnobF+QsyvrxFHYMuOwFc/Fi1d8n8poqHvII7I4pYqPyTMG5fLunAN0kKtBd3Ad/pRfa/Sw==</SignatureValue>
    <KeyInfo>
        <X509Data>
            <X509Certificate>MIIDdzCCAI+gAwIBAgIHBmQuU/N3CTANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADCBkjEQMA4GA1
            UEAxMHREJHQ0FEQjELMAkGA1UEBhMCReEsxEzARBgNVBAcTCkNvcGVuaGFnZW4xEDAOBgN
            VBAgTB0Rlbn1hcmsxGjAYBgNVBAoTEURhbnNrZSBCYW5lEdyb3VwMRQwEgYDVQQLEwtEYW
            5za2UgQmFuazEYMBYGA1UEBRMPNjExMjYyMjgyMjMwMTAyMB4XDTEwMTAwODA5NDQ1NFo
            XDTEyMTAwODA5NDQ1NFowgZQxJjAkBgNVBAMTHUhBTImgcU5tRU4gT0cgSIIUVEUgSEF
            OU0VOMQswCQYDVQQGEwJESzEnMCUGA1UEChMeRVNCSkVSRyBYWFhYWFrYWFrYWFr
            CAgICAgICAuMTQwMgYDVQQFEytTRS1OUi9EQUJBOjAwMTQ5ODE5MTgtQUdSOjY2MDY4NC1
            VU1I6MzYwODE3MIGfMA0GCSqGSib3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDMZBEIJ7Jh9Ogd/nm9zL
            uahfYaz2rJ8u5kHj20hleY1EaG2eTsPBa1p2UhbgM1/wdIujCu/zz8wg3DW1G7JawB3bS5nIQ+7A0i/
            OjA2A7QSF6kPZNu6LZIBy7gDKujpih8vPutPMXyvqT7zoellBqroPZodCgB++y01mocC8ywIDAQAB
            o1lwUDAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBRc1ZAUhzhAuhRy3UBGMj0IqOdozAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUGNq9ncto
            QOZhO9gUvNneZdMaw2lwDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgbAMA0GCSqGSib3DQEBCwUA4IBAQBvby2
            ZKbkLzLChIMnb4o+3sGSiikQycoClc1owJ14HisDKKgpYeGWMmamaGZEkVF19Y+gHI6ZNvtO2oyyy
            JrISPBhK/RJAOLSrSolqEqa15UoDIxgPo5zu+duN57g47JsrQG0hFVBItKKOy2whcGe8Qh1bjnunib
        </X509Certificate>
    </X509Data>
</Signature>
```

```

mL0XdSgmJ4a6GzPR+YIWu+Lag7tCii+1pYMSh1bWF5h3N9MLZ+85IAv5TJI8407FLnbBypRkOdK
dKAyE70cJGI975lmDWaHQ0U98AA2/RQfQzDdvsvEONNRpJu98x9AMJzBGsS0iFTd4y/X9qI/4rftj/9
Swu73ayFvkO2T6/tWPAHJNsJ9</X509Certificate>
<X509IssuerSerial>
    <X509IssuerName>serialNumber=611262282230102, OU=Danske Bank, O=Danske Bank
Group, ST=Denmark, L=Copenhagen, C=DK, CN=DBGCADB</X509IssuerName>
    <X509SerialNumber>1799000000001801</X509 SerialNumber>
</X509IssuerSerial>
</X509Data>
</KeyInfo>
</Signature>
</tns:RenewCertificateRequest>

```

The example uses the standard entire document enveloped signature reference ([<Reference URI="">](#)), and the signature covers the RenewCertificate request element.

It is also allowed to use an id attribute (eg: `id="G972dd040-2D"`) on the RenewCertificateRequest element and a reference in the signature pointing to the id (eg: [<Reference URI="#G972dd040-2D">](#)).

### iii. Encrypted request element

In the next example, the signed RenewCertificateRequest has been encrypted:

```

<xenc:EncryptedData Type="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#Element"
xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#">
    <xenc:EncryptionMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes256-cbc"/>

    <dsig:KeyInfo xmlns:dsig="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
        <xenc:EncryptedKey Recipient="name:DanskeBankCryptCERT">
            <xenc:EncryptionMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-1_5"/>
            <dsig:KeyInfo>
                <dsig:X509Data>
                    <dsig:X509Certificate>MIIDmDCCAoCgAwIBAgIFFAQjOnrMwDQYJKoZlhcvcNAQELBQA
wgCQxEAOBgNVBAMTB0RCR1JPT1QxCzAJBgNVBAYTAkRLRMwEQYDVQQHEw
pDb3BlbmhhZ2VuMRAwDgYDVQQIEwdEZW5tYXJrMRoWGAyDVQQKExFEYW5za2U
gQmFuayBHcm91cDEaMBgGA1UECxMRRGFuc2tIEJhbmsgR3JvdXAxDGAWBgNVBA
UTDzYxMTI2MjI4MTEzMAdMTEJMAcGA1UEBBMAMQkwBwYDVQQqEwAxCTAHBg
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```

</xenc:EncryptedData>

#### iv. SOAP request

Next, the encrypted RenewCertificateRequest is inserted in a SOAP message, where the RequestHeader is also added:

```

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<xmlns:pkif="http://danskebank.dk/PKI/PKIFactoryService">
    <soapenv:Header/>
    <soapenv:Body>
        <pkif:RenewCertificateIn>
            <pkif:RequestHeader>
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                <pkif:CustomerId>360817</pkif:CustomerId>
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</xenc:EncryptedData>
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</soapenv:Envelope>

```

## v. SOAP response

The next example shows a SOAP response to the RenewCertificateRequest:

```

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  xmlns:pkif="http://danskebank.dk/PKI/PKIFactoryService" xmlns:soapenv="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
  <soapenv:Header/>
  <soapenv:Body>
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        <pkif:CustomerId>360817</pkif:CustomerId>
        <pkif:RequestId>398</pkif:RequestId>
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        <pkif:InterfaceVersion>1</pkif:InterfaceVersion>
      </pkif:ResponseHeader>
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        <tns:tns="http://danskebank.dk/PKI/PKIFactoryService/elements">
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          <tns:ReturnText>OK</tns:ReturnText>

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## **Appendix C: CRL Reason codes**

The CRL Reason codes accepted by the `RevokeCertificate` and `CertificateStatus` operations are a subset of the reason codes specified in X.509v3 (RFC5280).

This listing shows all of the reasoncodes listed in RFC5280. The ones that are crossed over are not supported by the PKI Factory operations:

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```
CRLReason ::= ENUMERATED {  
    unspecified (0),  
    keyCompromise (1),  
    cACompromise (2),  
    affiliationChanged (3),  
    superseded (4),  
    cessationOfOperation (5),  
    certificateHold (6),  
    removeFromCRL (8),  
    privilegeWithdrawn (9),  
    aACompromise (10) }
```

The type of the field is an integer, and the content as listed above.